By Muhammad Khan

The People’s Republic of China (PRC) has enjoyed a significant surge of international influence, power, and strength, beginning near the turn of the 21st century. China has taken advantage of dwindling or deconsolidated American hegemony and regional power vacuums, pushing the international community to adapt to the changing political dynamics stimulated by China’s geopolitical, economic, and military, dominance. Canada is positioned uniquely within the context of China’s rise, being a key ally to the Western bloc, an obedient neighbour to the United States (China’s only “capable” competitor), but also sharing close cultural/economic ties and affiliations to China. I will present and analyze the foreign policy strategies, platforms, and doctrines, adopted by Canada during Prime Minister Justin Trudeau’s tenure (beginning in 2015); I will ultimately argue that Trudeau’s China strategy has fallen short of expectations and resulted in a worsening of Canadian-Sino relations, due to domestic skepticisms surrounding China, external factors like Xi Jinping’s increasingly hawkish foreign policy and the election of Trump, and foundationally, the asymmetrical nature of bilateral engagements. 

Trudeau’s administration, starting in 2015, sought the revitalizing and strengthening of Sino-Canadian relations, during his entry to office. This was reflected by the 2016 State visits between Trudeau and Chinese Premier Li Keqiang (Calvert, 2018). Trudeau, like his father, understood the weight and influence of a strategic relationship with China. Canadian engagement with China would have to follow precarious and careful measures, so not to reap economic/political repercussions, as engagement with China, characterized by the Canadian desire to influence Chinese behaviour towards liberal norms, is ultimately futile and unlikely. Engagement then must be viewed with more pragmatic considerations, meaning: if Canada cannot influence or alter Chinese actions in accordance with Western or liberal values, it can at least push for warmer relations. That will be the basis or criteria for discerning the Liberal government’s response to China, defined clearly as: Have relations become warmer? 

Trudeau differentiated himself from Stephen Harper and leveraged the historical Liberal attitudes towards China to enhance relations. Trudeau’s initial trade policies can be deemed as a continuation of Harper’s (despite Trudeau’s proposed intentions). Trudeau pushed forward the ratification of the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) with the EU and initiated public consultations on the Trans-Pacific Partnership, the latter representing Trudeau and Canada’s commitment to the Global South (Calvert, 2018). Unlike Harper, Trudeau also sought deepened relations with China, highlighted by moves like joining the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), which Harper had declined to enter and publicly critiqued (Calvert, 2018); this was however, a symbolic move. Clearly Trudeau wants China to view Canada constructively. To facilitate this, Trudeau sought cooperation with China in commerce, an area both nations had aligning interests. Trudeau overturned Harper’s decision to block Hong Kong-based O-Net Communication from acquiring Canadian-based ITF Technologies, albeit subjecting the deal to “certain undisclosed conditions” (Lim, 2020), reflecting a desire for cooperation without removing practical considerations. He then adopted an even softer approach to China-based Hytera’s acquisition of Norset, despite internal opposition from Conservatives. The Liberals had declined to conduct a Part IV.1 Review of the acquisition (an internal review of foreign investments) to highlight Canada’s commitment to promoting Chinese FDI (Lim, 2020). Evidently, Trudeau wants China as a partner, making trade the realm both nations can most optimally develop their relationship, something Trudeau’s government was efficient in identifying. In November 2018, Trudeau established the ‘Canada-China Economic and Financial Strategic Dialogue’, before this, both nations engaged in bilateral dialogue at the Track II Energy Dialogue in Halifax and the Innovation Dialogue in Beijing, in September and October of 2018, respectively (Lim, 2020). By 2019, both nations had signed over fifty commercial deals (Frolic, 2022). Reflects continued trade cooperation as a means of fostering relations. 

Another facet of Canada’s response to China’s rise is reflected in the Liberal government’s, Indo-Pacific Strategy. Canada clearly sees potential in the Global South for expanded trade and commerce, the Indo-Pacific region, however, specifically represents strategic opportunities for Canada, which it understands and has now begun to materialize from. The strategy includes plans and provisions that would indirectly challenge or target China, highlighting the Liberals view of China as a potential irrational actor. One proponent of the strategy is the upholding of regional stability and increased military presence. The plan aims to oppose unilateral actions that may disrupt the peace and status quo of operation in the Taiwan Strait and commits increased deployment of troops to region (Brewster, 2022). Interestingly, this is the same Canada that had decreased its NATO troop commitments during Harpers era due to a perceived lack of resources, possibly highlighting that Trudeau’s administration is taking a friendly, yet cautious and equipped approach to tackling China. With the Indo-Pacific Strategy, Canada commits $500 million over five years to enhance military cooperation with regional allies and a total of $2.9 billion in invested in the region (Brewster, 2022). This indicates that Trudeau is not naïve nor misinformed with China, instead it reinforces the view that he sees China as a threat but pursues relations due to strategic necessities. For Canada, China is a strategic partner, but it is also an “increasingly disruptive global power” (Brewster, 2022). The Indo-Pacific Strategy can, to some degree, be viewed as a measure of containment towards China (even if Canada lacks the capacity); though the strategy may not be overarchingly designed for China, it definitely took China’s influence in region into consideration. 

Another aspect of Canada’s position towards China can be highlighted by Deputy Prime Minister Chrystia Freeland in her Freeland Doctrine, which intended to deepen cooperation with democratic partners, extend cooperation to hybrid regimes, but most importantly, view authoritarian regimes as innately hostile towards democratic ones (Lilly, 2018). What’s interesting about this policy is that the Deputy PM regards it with notions of progressivism. This progressivism is again found within the Indo-Pacific Strategy and is hoisted on principles of trade that focus on social policies that benefit wider population, labour protections, environmental standards and gender-related provisions (Lilly, 2018). 

Diplomacy is another area of increased cooperation between both nations. The promise of a “golden era” of bilateral relations by PM Trudeau and Premier Li, was quickly materialized through extensive diplomatic initiatives (Calvert, 2018). Trudeau established the Annual Leaders Dialogue, of which the first summit promised: expanded trade, exploratory trade talks for a potential “Canada-China Free Trade Agreement” (FTA), and broadly, a new chapter for Sino-Canadian relations (Lim, 2020). 

Human rights are an area of engagement that historically and contemporarily breeds hostilities between the nations. Canadians have adopted the image of themselves as sustainers and protectors of human rights, a value deeply embedded within the populous. Historically, after the Tiananmen Crisis, the Canadian public pushed its government to condemn and punish China, which it did through low-level punitive measures. This highlights that Canada, through its national identity, will always actively remain a champion for human rights, despite strategic entailments. Trudeau’s government has experienced this clash of human rights rhetoric versus strategic interests first hand, ultimately, at the expense of Sino relations. Initially, Trudeau was hesitant to openly criticize China’s human rights record, this changed however, after some discourse surrounding a potential extradition treaty with China (Lim, 2020). The deal fell through due to Canadian concerns surrounding the death penalty in China, with Ambassador to China MaCallum (whose appointment was symbolic, as he hails from a riding with a large Chinese diaspora and is married to a half-Chinese woman) positing that Canada would not deport nationals (facing economic serious crimes) back to nations with the death penalty. However, interestingly, Canada has routinely deported individuals to China without guarantees or assurances surrounding torture (Lim, 2020), reflecting how the line of sentiment and rhetoric, has been at times forfeited due to practical aims, portraying Canada’s position within the asymmetrical nature of this bilateral relationship. To exacerbate tensions, Trudeau publicly condemned China in 2019 for violations against its Uighur population, dropping the Liberal adoption of quiet diplomacy. Subsequently, Ambassador MaCallum spearheaded a letter, along with fifteen other ambassadors, rebuking China; this angered the Chinese, who accused Canada of interference to their sovereignty (Kawasaki, 2021). 

Ultimately, the Canadian policy objectives towards China can be reflected as: 

  1. Upholding liberal, rules-based order and multilateralism 
  2. Supporting internal reform movements within China, as opposed to directly challenging it (Pau Woo, 2021)
  3. Pushing for China’s successful integration into global economy 
  4. Taking practical stances and positions in conflicts between US-China 

Both internal and external dimensions push Canada’s foreign policy towards China, contemporarily, it is evident that external factors take predominance over the handling of affairs, as one can explore through the following. Canadians have always been skeptical of China, despite understanding its importance. According to data in 2018, 55% of Canadians are in favour of free trade with China, 78% believe increasing economic ties will stimulate Canada’s economy, yet 64% say that stronger ties may lead to Canadian vulnerability to Chinese pressure (a threat identified by economists and the current administration) (Calvert, 2018). Years later in 2021, less than 15% of Canadian held favorable views toward PRC. Public skepticism around China domestically is direct product of China’s human rights violations, which as aforementioned, is a liberal tenet deeply enshrined within Canadian culture, politics, and the populous. Economic interests also play into these sentiments, as China’s role economically is significant to Canada due to vastness of Canadian exports in Chinese markets, and vice versa. These internal elements reflect a less prominent force within Canadian policymaking, as external factors dominate the Canadian landscape. Geopolitical environments drive Canadian decision-making, the US-China rivalry significantly influences Canada’s decisions, in terms of aligning itself with Western/Liberal order and strategic economic interests. Canada’s engagement with allies is innately strategic, alliances with Japan and South Korea, were fundamentally pushed by shared concerns about China’s assertiveness in South China Sea (Brewster, 2022). But again, trade becomes an area where Canada cannot afford to be hostile with China, as stated by Ambassador Barton: “China cannot be ignored where trade is concerned” (Frolic, 2022). Xi Jinping’s increasingly hawkish behaviour in South China Sea puts Canada in a difficult place in managing between strategic national interests (trade) and commitments to international systems (liberal order). Another element for Trudeau was dealing with the presidency of Trump and his adoption of “America First” and protectionist policies that undermined previous Canadian-US attempts of fostering growth with the international community. After signing the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) but not ratifying, Trudeau faced additional unease when Trump withdrew, removing Canada from the benefits entailed in deal (Calvert, 2018). 

In discussing the failures of Trudeau’s foreign policy towards China, one can highlight trade. Commercial affairs highlight the greatest area of cooperation between China-Canada. Justin Trudeau’s attempt at an FTA deal represents the Liberal desire for economic engagement. However, the effectiveness of these talks has been critiqued as protracted and without progress. One scholar suggests that these FTA talks will never move past the exploratory phase because of the “Liberal governments futile insistence on progressive provisions that would det mutual standards on labour, environmental and gender issues” (Lim, 2020); in reference to the Indo-Pacific Strategy and Freeland Doctrine. Adding in these progressive provisions makes little sense, as China does not need Canadian trade or access to markets to thrive, Canada is on the receiving end with the most to benefit from a bilateral FTA. Thus, derailing talks due to the implementation progressive provisions that China does not need to comply with, proved to be an ineffective policy by the Liberals. It appeared more as political pandering to liberal notions of equality or Trudeau’s attempt to gain political image points for getting China to alter its practices. Another failure of the Liberals can be characterized as political ‘hop-scotch’. The Liberals at first, using warm rhetoric promoted Chinese FDI but then became the only government to block the Chinese acquisition of a Canadian company, the construction firm Aecon, apparently at the indirect behest of the Americans (Kawasaki, 2021). This hurt Chinese perception of Canada, who accused the Liberals of being “lapdogs” to the US. This was not the only time, after releasing the Indo-Pacific Strategy, the Chinese responded by accusing them of undermining regional peace (Brewster, 2022). Due to the external forces that drive Canadian decision-making, Canada often finds itself in the middle of more powerful nations interests, making it difficult to adopt independent policy. Another example of this is when Canada detained Meng Wanzhou (CFO of Huawei) in 2018, again at the request of the Americans. The Chinese responded to this viciously, accusing Canada of “white supremacy”, taking two Canadians hostage, and banning some Canadian imports; this was later resolved in 2021 (Frolic, 2022). Strengths of Canada’s approach lie in its adopting of pragmatic aims of ensuring Canadian security interests while defending against the overwhelmingly coercion of China; China has not been able to dictate Canadian actions, like it has with other middle-powers. Another strength is the legislative barriers Trudeau had adopted to protect against aggressive FDI, especially those investments that put national security at risk (ex. Aecon). 

Ultimately, this article posited that the criteria for judging the Liberal’s foreign policy towards China was based on Trudeau’s own objective of warming relations. This paper examines and highlights that Trudeau’s tenure, though poised with good intentions, did not foster constructive relations with China, nor develop warmer sentiments, nor be able to influence China’s entry into the global international order. It produced a period of stagnation and a fracturing of Canada’s image. 

References

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Lim, P. (2020). Sino-Canadian relations in the age of Justin Trudeau. Canadian Foreign Policy 

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https://www.policymagazine.ca/canada-and-china-the-bilateral-journey-from-trudeau-to-trudeau/

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